Attitudes to equality : the"socialist legacy"revisited by Murthi, Mamta & Tiongson, Erwin R.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4529
Attitudes to Equality: 




Europe and Central Asia Region
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector 


















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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It is routinely assumed that residents of post-socialist 
countries have a preference for greater income equality, 
other things being equal, owing to the legacy of 
socialism.  This proposition is examined in the context of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union using data 
from three waves of the World Values Survey.  Contrary 
to expectations, the authors find little evidence of a 
‘socialist legacy’ en bloc.  Considering the former Soviet 
Union separately from other post-socialist countries, 
the analysis finds that as a group these countries display 
significantly lower preference for moving toward greater 
income equality than both Eastern Europe and other 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector and Human Development Sector 
Units, Europe and Central Asia Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the economic transition in 
former centrally planned economies. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The authors may be contacted at mmurthi@worldbank.org and etiongson@worldbank.org.
comparator groups (developed and developing countries).   
These findings hold up even when controlling for 
the conventional determinants of attitudes such as 
income level and employment status of the individual 
respondent, as well as national factors such as per-capita 
income and its distribution.  Moreover, the preference 
for greater income inequality appears to have persisted 
at least since the mid-1990s and possibly since the early 
1990s (data difficulties preclude a robust examination 
of this latter question).  The results are consistent with 
the fairly low levels of public spending on redistribution 
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ECA Region of the World Bank.   1 Introduction
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It is generally believed that owing to the legacy of the past there is a strong 
preference for income equality and redistributive state spending in post-socialist countries.  
Indeed a large body of literature points in this direction (see Table 1).  Yet countries in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union which are the focus of this paper are very 
diverse.  In the decade and a half since the end of the Soviet Union income inequality has 
increased everywhere but has risen far more in some countries than in others.  At one end of 
the spectrum, EU member-state Hungary remains among the world’s most equal countries.  
Its Gini coefficient for consumption in 2002 was 0.25.  At the other of the spectrum, 
Georgia has become more unequal in terms of the distribution of income than the United 
States.  Its Gini coefficient for consumption in 2003 was 0.39 (World Bank, 2005).  If there 
is a strong preference for more equal outcomes owing to a ‘socialist legacy’, why do we 
observe highly unequal outcomes in countries such as Georgia?  Do other factors, such as 
weak capacity to administer redistributive social programs, get in the way of implementing a 
broader social preference for more equal outcomes?  Or is the ‘socialist legacy’ itself a myth, 
there being no social or political consensus in favor of greater equality in countries such as 
Georgia despite the history of socialism?   
 
Existing literature does not provide much guidance on these questions as it largely 
focuses on countries in Eastern Europe with little or no coverage of the former Soviet 
Union (outside of Russia) where some of the more unequal outcomes are observed.  This 
paper attempts to address this gap in the literature by examining data from the World Values 
Survey which includes a large number of countries from both Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union.  The survey, which has been conducted in several rounds since the late 1980s, 
seeks people’s views on a number of issues, including income inequality and the role of the 
state.  We use the responses to examine whether there are systematic differences in 
professed views between post-socialist countries and others, but also within post-socialist 
countries between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and whether these 
differences have evolved over time.  In conducting our investigation we do our best to 
‘control’ for personal characteristics of the respondent such as age, gender, income group, 
labor market status and other factors, as well as societal characteristics such as per-capita 
income and overall levels of inequality in the country which may influence declared attitudes.    
 
The paper focuses on three questions in particular.  The first is, how do attitudes 
towards income equality and the role of the state differ between post-socialist countries and 
other countries in the world?  Is there ‘a socialist legacy’ in the sense of a stronger preference 
for equality in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union than elsewhere?  This question 
essentially revisits the earlier literature using data from a wider group of countries than in 
previous studies.  Our results show that Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are a 
diverse group with little robust statistical evidence that as a group they display a greater 
preference for equality than other countries.  There is a strong preference for equality in  
 
                                                 
2 This paper was developed with support from the Chief Economist’s office of the ECA Region of the World 
Bank.  We are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts from Asad Alam, Giacomo 
Corneo, Marianne Fay, Ronald Inglehart, Christine Lipsmeyer, Marcelo Selowsky, and Salman Zaidi.  Any 
errors of interpretation are ours alone.  
  2Table 1. Preferences for Redistribution and the "Socialist Legacy": Summary of Selected Studies
Socialist
Study Data
1 Year Sample Legacy
2
Andreβ and Heien (2001) ISSP 1992 Germany (East and West), Norway, USA Yes
Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln (2006) GSOEP 1997, 2002 Germany (East and West) Yes
Austen (2002) ISSP 1987, 1992 Hungary, Poland and high-income (OECD) 
countries
Yes
Blanchflower & Freeman (1997) ISSP 1987, 1992 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia and Slovenia and high-income (OECD) 
countries including Germany (East and West)
Yes
Boeri and others (2001) Own  2000 Germany (East and West), France, Italy and 
Spain
Yes
Corneo (2001) ISSP 1992 Germany (East and West), United States Yes
Corneo and Gruner (2002) ISSP 1992 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia and high-income (OECD) countries 
including Germany (East and West)
Yes
Delhey (1999) ISSP 1992 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia and Slovenia and high-income (OECD) 
countries including Germany (East and West)
Yes
Heien (2000) ISSP 1985, 1990, 
1996
Bulgaria, Hungary and high-income (OECD) 
countries including Germany (East and West)
Mixed
Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom (2003) ISSP 1996 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Russia and Slovenia and high-income 
(OECD) countries
Mixed
Mason (1995) ISJP 1991 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Russia, Slovenia 
Yes
Redmond and others (2002) ISSP 1999 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia and high-
income (OECD) countries including Germany 
(East and West)
Yes
Shiller, and others (1991) Own 1990 U.S. and Russia No
Suhrcke (2001) ISSP 1999 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia and high-
income (OECD) countries including Germany 
(East and West)
Yes
Verwiebe and Wegener (2000) ISJP 1991, 1996 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia and 
Western Germany
No
Wong (2004) WVS 1990 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovenia other countries including China and 
Germany (East and West)
No
1GSOEP: German Socioeconomic Panel; ISJP: International Social Justice Program; ISSP: International Social Survey Programme; 
WVS: World Values Survey; and own survey.
2The papers covered here do not necessarily explicitly test for the existence of a socialist legacy. The summary information is based on
our judgement of  whether the main empirical results suggest the existence of such a legacy.
  3some countries but not in others making it difficult to conclude that there is a socialist legacy 
in attitudes for the group as a whole. 
 
Second, are there systematic differences between post-socialist countries and if so, 
do they fall along familiar ‘fault lines’?  In particular, do attitudes differ systematically 
between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union?  As the opening paragraph 
illustrates, many countries in Eastern Europe are characterized by lower income 
(consumption) inequality, which is related in part to higher levels of redistributive public 
spending.   Is this pattern of redistribution consistent with underlying preferences?  Our 
results show that it is.  Even when controlling for other factors residents of the former 
Soviet Union profess significantly lower preference for equality than their counterparts in 
Eastern Europe.  What is interesting - and a little surprising - is that they also profess lower 
preference for equality than the denizens of developing countries.  The socialist legacy - if 
there was ever one - has long since evaporated. 
 
Finally, how have attitudes evolved over time?  We find no evidence of change in 
attitudes in the post-socialist countries since the mid-1990s and on a more restricted sample 
since the early 1990s.   This sets apart our findings from previous work.  The majority of 
studies on attitudes towards equality are cross-sectional in nature, examining differences at a 
point in time across countries or individuals.  A few however look at changes over time.  
The ones that do suggest that people’s preferences may evolve over time to favor less equal 
outcomes.  For example, Blanchflower and Freeman (1997) and Verwiebe and Wegener 
(2000) present evidence to suggest that even though residents of post-socialist countries may 
inherit preferences which are influenced by the egalitarian values of the past, these are likely 
to be eroded over time in response to actual increases in inequality.  In our results we find 
no evidence of such a negative time trend in preference for equality.   
    
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section (Section 2) provides 
a brief overview of the socialist legacy literature.  Section 3 explores the data on attitudes 
towards equality from the World Values Survey using graphs and tables while Section 4 
presents the detailed econometric specification.  Section 5 presents the main results from the 
most recent wave of the data.  Section 6 discusses how attitudes appear to have evolved over 
time.  Section 7 presents results based on alternative estimates of preferences while Section 8 
concludes.   
   
2 Attitudes to equality: what do we know?  
 
  The literature on attitudes to inequality in post-socialist countries – summarized in 
Table 1 - has two main strands.   
 
In the first, the emphasis is on whether attitudes to equality systematically differ 
between post-socialist countries and established market economies.  The premise of these 
studies is that if people living in post-socialist countries are significantly more in favor of 
income equality (and thus significantly more averse to income inequality) than those living in 
the West, then this could represent a significant attitudinal barrier to policy reforms, 
especially those of the kind that are likely to raise inequality.  Shiller, Boycko and Korobov 
(1991) considered attitudes towards income inequality along with other ‘market-oriented’ 
  4behaviors and concluded that Soviet and American respondents were “basically similar”.
3  
Their analysis was however based on a survey of Moscow and New York residents alone. 
 
Subsequent work based on more representative samples of the populations in 
question – typically drawn from the International Social Justice Program (ISJP) or the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) - concluded differently, with residents of former socialist 
countries found to display more egalitarian attitudes to a range of indicators of income 
equality (Mason 1995, Blanchflower and Freeman 1997, Delhey 1999, Verwiebe and 
Wegener 2000, Suhrcke 2001, Redmond, Schnepf and Suhrcke 2002, Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündeln 2006).  The conclusion was that there may in fact be significant attitudinal 
barriers to market-oriented reforms. At the same time, the studies that looked at trends 
found that the preference for equality declined over time (Blanchflower and Freeman 1997,  
Verwiebe and Wegener 2000, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2006).  Thus, post-socialist 
countries, even if they did not start out with similar preferences, appeared over time to be 
approaching the preferences found in market economies.  Owing to the absence of data 
these studies did not cover the former Soviet Union extensively outside of Russia.  There 
was also limited attempt to differentiate between post-socialist countries through the use of 
country dummies and other approaches which allow for variation among countries.  So, all 
post-socialist countries were basically ‘tarred with the same brush’.         
 
  The second strand of the literature probes people’s preferences for redistributive 
spending by the state, which is distinct but not unrelated to attitudes to income inequality.  
The purpose is to determine the degree to which there is political support for a larger or 
more active role of the state in addressing issues of poverty and inequality through transfer 
programs.  Data sources for this strand of the literature are broader than the first strand, and 
include data from the World Values Survey (WVS), in addition to International Social Justice 
Program and the International Social Survey Program.  Coverage of post-socialist countries 
is somewhat greater (Heien 2000, Andreß and Heien 2001, Boeri, Borsch-Supan and 
Tabellini 2001, Corneo and Gruner 2002, Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003, and Wong 2004).   
 
The findings of this second strand are consistent with the first strand in the sense 
that respondents from post-socialist countries are generally found to profess greater support 
for redistributive state spending than their U.S. or Western counterparts. At the same time, 
this literature conveys a more nuanced picture.  Heien (2000) finds that compared to the 
U.S., there is greater professed support for redistributive government programs not only 
among post-socialist countries but also among OECD countries such as Norway and Italy.  
Thus, strong support for redistribution compared to the U.S. does not appear to be confined 
to post-socialist countries.   Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom (2003) look at two composite 
indicators of support for redistribution, one based on views of the types of services 
governments should be responsible for and the other related to views on levels of public 
spending (including redistributive state spending).  They find post-socialist countries to be 
different from high income OECD countries only on the second indicator but not on the 
first.  Both these papers thus provide only qualified support for the “socialist legacy” 
                                                 
3 In their words “Although the Soviet respondents were somewhat less likely to accept exchange of money as a 
solution to personal problems and although their attitudes toward business were less warm, we found that 
Soviet and American respondents were basically similar…in their attitudes towards fairness, income inequality, 
and incentives and in their understanding of the working of markets” (385).  
  5hypothesis.  Wong (2004) goes a step further.  Using the 1990 wave of the World Values 
Survey, Wong reports significant variation among post-socialist countries with some countries 
found to be more supportive of redistribution, but others no different and still others less 
supportive than the United States, thereby calling into question the existence of a socialist 
legacy en bloc. In the most recent installment of this literature, Chong and Gradstein (2006) 
compare support for public spending in Finland with that in the Baltic republics and find 
that along selected dimensions, the Baltic states appear no different from Finland.       
 
 
3 The World Values Survey and attitudes to equality   
 
 
  This paper probes attitudes to inequality using micro-data from successive waves of 
the World Value Surveys (WVS).  As with other attitudinal surveys, these surveys are designed 
to enable cross-country comparisons of values and attitudes on a broad range of issues.
 4  
For our purposes one of the important features of these surveys is that they cover a wide 
range of post-socialist countries from both Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
As the survey has been fielded in four waves since the early 1980s, the data allow us to 
examine trends in attitudes to equality over time.   
 
We focus in this paper on the three waves conducted since the fall of the Berlin wall: 
1999-2001, 1995-97, and 1990.
5  The 1999-2001 wave includes 23 countries from Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union out of a total of 78, the 1995-97 survey 18 out of a 
total of 49, and the 1990 survey 12 out of a total of 42. However, as data on a few key 
independent variables such as educational attainment of individuals surveyed are not 
available for a number of countries, the sample of countries covered by the regression 
analysis in the next section is smaller. In particular, we have samples of 17, 15, and 4 
countries from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from the 1999-2001, 1995-1997, and 
1990 waves, respectively (see Appendix Table 1). Country coverage varies from wave to 
wave.  Because the 1999-2001 wave covers the greatest number of post-socialist economies, 
we focus first on this wave. 
 
  Preferences for equality may be gauged from more than one question in the WVS. 
The most relevant question for our purposes is one in which respondents are asked to rank 
their views on a ten-digit scale where 1 stands for “Incomes should be made more equal” 
and 10 for “Incomes differences should be larger to provide incentives for individual effort.” 
It is also the survey question with the most number of responses and covers the most 
number of countries. The interpretation of this indicator requires caution: lower values of 
this measure indicate greater preference for equality. 
6 
 
There is a huge variation in response to this question both within and across 
countries.  In Figure 1 we plot mean response by country against GDP per capita for the 
                                                 
4 The surveys are conducted by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) 
based at the University of Michigan.  A detailed description of the survey method and instrument may be 
found in Inglehart et. al. (2004).   
5 Data from the most recent wave 2005-2007 are not available at this time. 
6 Other questions are discussed in the final section of the paper.   
  61999-2001 wave. We see that per capita income and preference for equality are positively 
correlated with richer countries showing a greater preference for equality, and that the 
relationship is possibly stronger among countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union than in the sample as a whole.  The positive correlation may be for 
several reasons.  The preference for equality may be something of a luxury, which becomes 
more affordable as countries grow richer.  Richer countries may also have greater means to 
redistribute and this may affect preferences.  In Figure 2, we present a similar plot of the 
mean response by country against the Gini coefficient (averaged over the 1990s through the 
early 2000s, due to limited data availability). Preferences for equality are somewhat negatively 
related to income inequality in the sample as a whole. As in Figure 1, this may have several 
drivers and the line of causality is not clear: On one hand, a more equal distribution of 
income may serve to promote a greater collective preference for equality. On the other hand, 
greater preferences for equality may lead to policy choices that promote a more egalitarian 
distribution of income. It is interesting that for the countries which are the subject of this 
paper, higher inequality in the distribution of income is associated with a lower preference 
for moving towards greater equality.   
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Source: World Bank (2005) WDI database; WVS 1999-2001; and authors' calculations.
Note: Per capita income is log of 2000 income in 2000 PPP terms. Lower values of preference for 
equality indicate greater preference for income equality.
 













































Source: World Bank (2005) WDI database; WVS 1999-2001; and authors' calculations. Lower values of preference for equality indicate 
greater preference for income equality.
 
 
However, underlying levels of income and inequality are not the whole story.  Table 
2 presents mean scores by quartiles and suggests that in addition to income and inequality 
there are distinct geographic patterns in preferences. The lowest quartile representing the 
greatest preference for equality is dominated by countries from Central and Eastern Europe.  
Preferences in this group are similar to more advanced economies such as Austria (4.6), 
Finland (4.6), and France (4.8). However, Lithuania, part of the former Soviet Union, also 
falls in this group.  The top-most quartile reflecting the lowest preferences for equality is 
dominated by countries from the former Soviet Union (FSU) such as Estonia, Moldova, 
Ukraine and Russia. However, Bulgaria also falls in this group.  The preferences of these 
countries are roughly comparable to those of low-income and middle-income developing 
countries such as Bangladesh (7.6), Peru (7.5), and Uganda (7.2). The exceptions 
notwithstanding, it would appear that if countries display a strong preference for equality 
they are likely to be from Eastern Europe, while if they display a low preference for equality 
they are likely to be from the former Soviet Union.   
 
There are several reasons why countries in Central and Eastern Europe may be more 
inclined towards greater equality than countries that descended from the Soviet Union. First, 
this group of countries endured the economic disruption that ensued after the fall of the 
Berlin wall in 1989 and the end of communism relatively well.  The decline in output was 
smaller for countries of Central and Eastern Europe than for countries of the former Soviet 
Union.  Indeed, by the mid-1990s CEE had begun climbing out of the transition recession.  
By contrast, output decline was steeper and persisted longer in the former Soviet Union 
(World Bank 2002). This steeper and longer decline in the former Soviet Union may have 
resulted in more fraying of the social fabric, and a greater emphasis on self-preservation than 
among the citizens of the CEE. 
  8 
Table 2. Mean Preference for Equality Ranked by Quartile:
Selected Post-Socialist Economies
Quartile Country Mean Score




Second quartile Montenegro 5.18
Belarus 5.27
Republic Of Macedonia 5.33
Czech Republic 5.48
Third quartile Serbia 5.78
Albania 5.96
Poland 6.09
Bosnia And Herzegovina 6.10
Highest quartile Bulgaria 6.12









Second, many countries of Central and Eastern Europe have a longer history as 
nation-states than countries of the former Soviet Union.  Moreover, the end of the Soviet 
Union was marked by large ethnic migrations as people moved in an attempt to be reunited 
with dominant ethnic groups in other nations.  This is particularly true of ethnic Russians 
who migrated to Russia in large numbers, but is also true of many other nationalities 
(Mansoor and Quillin 2006).  This, too, may have resulted in a greater sense of solidarity 
within countries in Central and Eastern Europe than in countries of the former Soviet 
Union.  Finally, countries in CEE had some pre-socialist experience as market economies 
whereas this experience was largely absent in large parts of the former Soviet Union. This, 
combined with geographical proximity to Western Europe, may have made them opt for a 
more socialist approach to a market economy in which income inequality is kept to a 
  9manageable minimum. By way of contrast, countries of the former Soviet Union may have 
embraced greater inequality as a part of a strong desire to move away from the former 
command economy with its host of regulations dampening differences in income, 
particularly wage-income.         
 
For all these reasons we have reason to believe that preference for greater inequality 
is likely to be stronger in the former Soviet Union than in Central and Eastern Europe.  
Whether this “cleavage” is upheld by the data is examined further in the sections below. 
 
 
4 Data and specification  
  
  The country averages presented in Table 2 suggest that post-socialist countries 
display widely differing attitudes towards income equality.  Moreover, a higher preference for 
equality is more likely to be found in the countries of Eastern Europe than in the former 
Soviet Union.  Is this borne out when we control not just for income and societal levels of 
inequality, but also the many individual factors that influence the scores?    
 
  To probe further we undertake an analysis of the micro-data on individual 
preferences from the WVS.  In line with the rest of the literature, we hypothesize that an 
individual’s preference for equality is a function of personal characteristics, such as age, 
education, marital status, number of children, gender, income, and so on, as well as societal 
factors, such as per-capita income, prevailing levels of inequality and country ‘legacy’.  Thus:  
 
 P ij = f( Xij, Zj, εij),  
 
where Pij is a vector of preferences for equality (on a scale of 1 to 10) of individuals i in 
country j ,  Xij is vector of personal characteristics, Zj is a vector of country-specific factors, 
and εij a vector of individual-specific errors.  
 
To estimate the relationship between these variables we use an ordered probit model 
that explains inequality aversion as a function of individual and country-level characteristics. 
The model allows for the fact that the variable we are trying to explain is an ordinal variable 
– reflecting ordering of preferences - rather than a cardinal variable whose value can be used 
to infer precise strength of preference  (we can make no presumption that a score of 4 is 
twice as strong as a score of 2). In the context of such a model, a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on an explanatory variable means that it increases the preference for 
the highest score 10 (that is, it increases the preference for greater income inequality). 
 
Much of the literature finds age affects preferences such that older people believe 
more strongly in equality of income than the younger people.  This may be related to a 
number of factors, including greater expectations of state provision of income security in old 
age.  On the other hand, inequality aversion typically falls with educational attainment 
possibly reflecting the belief of the higher educated that they are more deserving of greater 
rewards.  Women are typically found to have stronger preferences for equality than men. 
This may represent gender differences in preferences or may reflect an underlying economic 
condition, such as average job insecurity (Scehve 2005).  Those who are relatively well off 
are found to believe less in income equality, possibly because they see their relative income 
  10as a reflection of past effort, or merit, or both.  The unemployed are found to have a greater 
preference for equality than the employed perhaps owing to their disadvantage in the labor 
market.  The self-employed, on the hand, often see higher incomes as a reward for effort and 
risk taking and therefore have lower preference for income equality.   
 
The WVS has information on age, gender, number of children, marital status, 
education, income and labor market status.  Age is measured in years.  Educational 
attainment is measured in terms of four levels of education–-primary, secondary (technical 
or vocational), secondary (general), and university–-with information on whether the level 
was completed or was incomplete. Income status which is self-declared is either lower 
income, middle income or higher income.  Labor market status can be: full time employee 
(30 or more hours a week), part time employee (less than 30 hours a week), self-employed, 
retired, or other.  In the specification adopted for the analysis, the impact of variables such 
as gender, education, income and labor market status is assessed relative to a middle income, 
full-time employed, male with completed primary education (the default group).  
 
At the country level, we include data on per-capita GDP and the prevailing level of 
inequality.  Per capita GDP is measured in PPP terms (2000) while income inequality is 
measured by the Gini coefficient. Because data on the Gini is not typically available on an 
annual basis, we use the average Gini for the 1990 to 2002 period. Data are drawn from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) database.  
 
We also allow for variation among countries and country-groups using dummies.  
We begin by using dummies for each country.  Then to consider whether there is a distinct 
pattern among all post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
we treat them as as a block.  Finally, we consider distinct country groups within post-socialist 
countries as suggested by Table 2.  Our first group consists of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) where we expect to find a higher preference for equality.  The 
second group consists of countries of former Soviet Union (CIS) where we expect to find a 
lower preference for inequality.  The Baltic republics are somewhat hard to classify, so we 
create a distinct group for them.  In the specifications with individual country dummies the 
U.S. is the default country. Where country group dummies are used the default is the group 
of Advanced Economies.  A full list of countries that fall into different groups may be found 
in Appendix Table 1.
7   
 
In the analysis that follows we typically consider all countries and individuals for 
which we have a complete set of data (both left and right hand side variables).  The WVS 
also includes a few sub-national units which are not appropriate for our analysis.  These units 
were excluded from the analysis.
8  As country coverage varies by wave, trends over time may 
reflect both changes in preferences and changes in the country composition of the sample.  
For the trend analysis we therefore focus on countries which are represented in each of the 
waves.   
                                                 
7 It should be noted that for the purposes of our analysis South Korea and Singapore are classified as 
developing countries as they were not classified in international statistical publications as “Advanced 
Economies” till 1997 which is well into the period under consideration.   
8 The following units were deleted: Northern Ireland and Puerto Rico (1990, 1995-97, 1999-2001); Tambov, 
Moscow, Basque, Andalusia, Galicia, & Valencia (1990, 1995-97). 
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5 Main results  
 
  Table 3 reports the summary results of an ordered probit regression using data from 
the 1999-2001 wave.  In column 1 we use country dummies for individual countries (the 
country coefficients are too numerous to be shown), Column 2 distinguishes the post-
socialist economies as a group from other comparator countries, and Columns 3 and 4 
classify post-socialist economies into three groups as discussed above.  Measures of 
goodness of fit suggest that our regressions perform as well as the existing literature.   
  
Beginning first with the impact of personal characteristics we see that employment 
status, gender, education, income are generally significant and in the direction consistent 
with the literature across all specifications. For example, the unemployed are more likely to 
prefer greater equality or greater redistribution while the self-employed (individuals who can 
be typically assumed to be less risk averse) prefer greater inequality. Those with relatively low 
(high) income also prefer greater (lesser) equality. Similarly, individuals with lower (higher) 
educational attainment prefer greater (lesser) equality.  
 
We now turn to our main research question.  We find that there is limited evidence 
of a socialist legacy in attitudes to equality as typically understood in the literature.  When we 
use individual country dummies (Table 3, Column 1), we find that some countries prefer 
greater, some less, and some as much inequality as the benchmark country (U.S.), controlling 
for all other independent variables. This is consistent with Wong’s (2004) previous finding, 
based on the 1990 wave of the WVS. Turning next to post-socialist countries as a group 
(Table 3, column 2) we find that they do not display a greater preference for equality than the 
benchmark group (advanced economies).  In fact, they show a stronger preference for 
inequality than advanced economies.   Disaggregating further however reveals differences 
across the different sub-groups of post-socialist economies (Table 3, column 3).  Countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe do in fact display a stronger preference for equality than 
advanced economies.  But countries in the former Soviet Union show a greater preference 
for inequality. This is the case with both the Baltics and the rest of the former Soviet Union.  
The relative size of the coefficients suggests, however, that the preference for inequality is 
weaker in the Baltics than in the remainder of the former Soviet Union.  Thus the Baltics fall 
in between the patterns observed in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. Another interesting finding is that preference for inequality in the former Soviet 
Union (excluding the Baltics) is stronger than in developing countries as a whole. 
          
We now turn briefly next to the impact of income inequality (as proxied by the Gini 
coefficient) and the average income per capita (Table 3, Column 4).  Although this analysis is 
for a slightly smaller number of countries due to issues of data availability, the results suggest 
that firstly, including these additional country level factors does not overturn our basic 
conclusions, and the geographic pattern to preference for equality is upheld.  Secondly, lower 
measured inequality is significantly associated with greater preference for equality, as 
hypothesized in section 3, but there is no measurable statistical link between income per 
capita and preferences for equality.   
 
  It is possible that these findings across the different geographical groupings are 
driven by differences in the level of confidence in the effectiveness of governments' 
  12redistributive mechanisms, in particular where there is higher confidence in government, 
there may be a preference for lower income inequality because of the belief that 
government’s may be able to address the issue of income inequality effectively.
9 We 
attempted to examine this question by adding a variable on the level of confidence in 
government.
10  We find that results in Table 3 are robust the inclusion of this new variable. 
The coefficient estimates for the country groups are basically the same and remain 
significant.  
 
To examine whether our findings on geographic patterns in attitudes to equality are 
robust to survey year we conducted similar analyses using the 1995-97 and 1990 waves of the 
WVS.  As mentioned previously, the 1995-97 wave has useable data on 15 post-socialist 
countries and the 1990 wave data on 4 post-socialist countries.  To look at patterns in 
preferences we estimate the same regression as in Table 3, column 3.
11  For the 1990 wave, 
we can consider only CEE and the Baltics as there are no countries from the former Soviet 
Union (outside of the Baltics) in the sample.   
 
Our analysis suggests that our findings are indeed robust.  We find that there is a 
greater preference for inequality in post-socialist countries compared to advanced economies 
in both waves.  Where data permit, we find that countries in the former Soviet Union in 
particular show a marked preference for income inequality compared to both advanced 
economies and the countries of CEE (see Appendix Table 2).  It should be noted, however, 
that because the country coverage of WVS in 1995-97 and 1990 is somewhat different from 
that of 1999-2001 (see Appendix Table 1) the results are not fully comparable across waves 
unless we restrict the sample to countries represented in both waves.  We take this up 
further below.   
                                                 
9 We thank Giacomo Corneo for this suggestion 
10 The measure of confidence in government is based on responses to the following survey question: “I am 
going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in 
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” 
Responses are recoded into a binary variable, with 1 signifying a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in 
government. 
11 We do not include per-capita income and inequality in this analysis to keep the sample size as large as 
possible. Relative to the 1999-2001 period, fewer observations on the Gini coefficient are available for the 1990 
and 1995-07 periods. In addition, reliable data on per capita income in 1990 are generally not available for post-
socialist economies. The results in Table 3 (columns 3 and 4), however, suggest that the relative rankings of the 
country groups are invariant to the inclusion of per-capita income and inequality in the analysis.  
  13Table 3. Preference for Equality (Ordered Probit): 1999-2001
(Robust z-statistics in parentheses)
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Age
1 -3.5 -6.243 -5.711 -5.854
(1.82) (3.33)** (3.05)** (3.05)**
Age-squared
1 29.472 56.717 49.115 53.623
(1.44) (2.82)** (2.44)* (2.60)**
Female -0.045 -0.03 -0.035 -0.029
(4.32)** (2.93)** (3.45)** (2.77)**
No. of Children 0.001 0.018 0.017 0.016
(0.16) (5.09)** (4.95)** (4.50)**
Married 0.022 -0.013 -0.006 -0.03
(1.88) (1.13) (0.54) (2.62)**
Education
Incomplete Technical/Vocation Education 0.033 0.072 0.063 0.094
(1.66) (3.73)** (3.26)** (4.90)**
Complete Technical/Vocation Education 0.141 0.215 0.19 0.212
(8.28)** (13.09)** (11.61)** (12.63)**
Incomplete Secondary Education 0.113 0.173 0.119 0.113
(5.83)** (9.44)** (6.46)** (6.02)**
Complete Secondary Education 0.171 0.193 0.174 0.163
(10.49)** (12.71)** (11.43)** (10.24)**
Incomplete University Education 0.214 0.266 0.254 0.258
(11.01)** (14.33)** (13.67)** (13.52)**
Complete University Education 0.255 0.326 0.292 0.278
(14.77)** (20.17)** (18.01)** (16.54)**
Income
Lower Income -0.039 -0.017 -0.024 -0.023
(3.20)** (1.40) (1.98)* (1.86)
Higher Income 0.113 0.119 0.123 0.115
(9.40)** (10.34)** (10.65)** (9.62)**
Labor Force Status
Part-Time Employed -0.039 -0.04 -0.058 -0.059
(1.89) (2.01)* (2.93)** (2.87)**
Self-Employed 0.094 0.055 0.063 0.045
(5.50)** (3.25)** (3.73)** (2.61)**
Unemployed -0.072 -0.106 -0.098 -0.092
(3.34)** (5.03)** (4.69)** (4.30)**
Retired (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
(3.68)** (5.40)** (5.33)** (5.95)**
Other -0.026 -0.056 -0.049 -0.071





Developing countries 0.147 0.142 0.174
(12.63)** (12.14)** (9.00)**




Other Former Soviet Union (FSU) 0.423 0.316
(24.71)** (13.09)**
Other country-level control variables





Observations 63,874 63,874 63,874 61,281
Country Dummies Yes No No No
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent
Note: Dependent variable is a 10-point scale from 1 (Preference for equality) to 10 (Preference for inequality).
1Age and per capita income divided by 1,000, to produce sufficently large coefficients for display.
2Where country dummies are ised, the benchmark country is the U.S. Where country group dummies are used, 
the benchmark group are the advanced economies.  
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6 The evolution of attitudes over time  
 
We now turn to an analysis of trends in preferences over time.  If we look at all 
countries, and not just former transition economies, the three waves of the World Values 
Survey suggest that over the 1990s there has been a small but significant shift in preferences 
towards greater equality. On average, on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 indicates a preference 
for greater equality and 10 greater inequality, scores fell from 6.8 in the 1990 wave to 5.8 in 
1999-2001.   
 
Inference is however made difficult by the fact that country composition has 
changed over the waves, with countries being added over time.  If we focus only on 
countries which are repeated in each of the waves, while inference is more straightforward, 
we are confined to a smaller sample of countries.  The smaller sample, too, suggests that 
there has been a shift in preferences towards greater equality.  The shift is largely driven by 
shift in preferences in developing countries. Preferences in other groups have moved 
marginally, if at all, also in favor of greater equality.  These shifts have not changed the 
relative preferences across country groupings, with CEE showing a stronger preference for 
equality than the CIS, and the Baltics somewhere in between. 
 
We now examine conditional trends over time by replicating the analysis in Table 3.  
As mentioned previously country coverage varies across waves.  As coefficients may vary 
either due to differences in preferences or due to changes in the country composition of the 
sample, we need to maintain the same countries in the sample over time.  In order to do this 
we consider two distinct samples (see Appendix Table 1 for details):  
 
(i)  “Panel-2”  which includes countries represented in both the 1995-97 and 1999-
2001 waves; and  
(iii)        “Panel-3” which includes countries represented in all three waves (1990, 1995-
97 and 1999-2001). 
 
As there were no countries from the former Soviet Union outside of the Baltics in 
the 1990 wave, “Panel-3” is not useful for addressing one of our main hypotheses, namely, 
that these countries display a weaker preference for inequality than Central and Eastern 
Europe.   In addition, this sample includes a single CEE country (Poland).  The inference, 
which can be drawn for the period of the 1990s as a whole, is therefore somewhat limited. 
With this caveat on sample size and composition in mind, we use the “Panel-2” and “Panel-
3” samples to replicate the equation in Table 3 column 3.  Table 4 presents our findings.  
 
We first consider the period from the mid 1990s to the late 1990s using the “Panel-
2” sample.  As Table 4 suggests, preferences for equality in post-socialist economies 
remained largely stable over this period, with the possible exception of CEE.  Countries of 
the former Soviet Union maintained a stronger preference for income inequality relative to 
advanced economies over this period.  At the same time, relative to advanced economies, 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe also maintained a stronger preference for income 
inequality, although this effect is not statistically significant in 1999-01 and is weaker than the 
preference for income inequality among countries of the former Soviet Union.  The Baltic 
republics lie somewhere in between the two groups. 
  15Table 4. Preference for Equality (Ordered Probit): 1999-2001
(Robust z-statistics in parentheses)
Panel-2 Panel-3
1995-97 1999-01 1990-93 1995-97 1999-01
Age
1 -16.493 -4.084 -23.786 -22.045 -7.964
(4.64)** (1.550) (2.66)** (2.81)** (1.670)
Age-squared
1 126.392 21.078 237.163 202.542 61.385
(3.32)** (0.730) (2.42)* (2.28)* (1.170)
Female -0.083 -0.019 -0.079 -0.013 -0.002
(5.00)** (1.450) (2.00)* (0.380) (0.100)
No. of Children 0.042 0.006 0.072 0.023 0.014
(5.87)** (1.250) (4.22)** (1.700) (1.680)
Married 0.001 -0.046 -0.056 -0.021 -0.139
(0.060) (3.05)** (1.150) (0.540) (5.16)**
Education
Incomplete Technical/Vocation Education 0.026 0.216 0.053 0.014 0.066
(0.910) (7.82)** (0.840) (0.280) (1.400)
Complete Technical/Vocation Education 0.219 0.317 0.215 0.182 0.317
(9.17)** (15.05)** (4.90)** (3.74)** (7.99)**
Incomplete Secondary Education 0.049 0.18 0.385 0.015 0.013
(1.410) (6.56)** (6.63)** (0.230) (0.250)
Complete Secondary Education 0.173 0.264 0.365 0.086 0.101
(5.90)** (12.47)** (4.21)** (1.380) (2.74)**
Incomplete University Education 0.375 0.416 -0.23 0.269 0.442
(9.07)** (14.96)** (1.680) (3.39)** (8.25)**
Complete University Education 0.348 0.417 9.514 0.307 0.296
(12.68)** (18.73)** (70.97)** (5.69)** (7.43)**
Income
Lower Income -0.023 0.000 -0.051 -0.127 -0.050
(1.180) (0.010) (1.150) (3.33)** (1.750)
Higher Income 0.126 0.084 0.16 0.124 0.03
(6.20)** (5.49)** (3.41)** (3.27)** (1.030)
Labor Force Status
Part-Time Employed -0.049 -0.039 -0.151 -0.088 -0.078
(1.420) (1.540) (2.67)** (1.300) (1.540)
Self-Employed 0.159 0.145 0.301 0.160 0.193
(5.51)** (6.30)** (4.01)** (3.17)** (5.05)**
Unemployed -0.085 -0.035 0.038 -0.102 -0.071
(2.56)* (1.440) (0.310) (1.450) (1.540)
Retired -0.048 -0.061 -0.145 -0.114 -0.147
(1.540) (2.20)* (2.07)* (1.620) (2.95)**
Other 0.104 0.012 (0.057) (0.020) 0.027
(4.13)** (0.660) (0.880) (0.380) (0.750)
Country Group Dummies
2
Developing countries 0.312 -0.082 -0.087 0.126 -0.084
(12.36)** (4.44)** (1.250) (2.51)* (2.31)*
Central and Eastern Europe 0.077 0.024 0.824 0.733 0.500
(2.91)** (1.080) (11.77)** (11.05)** (11.11)**
Baltics 0.062 0.098 0.562 0.246 0.344
(2.01)* (3.10)** (9.37)** (4.88)** (8.11)**
Other Former Soviet Union (FSU) 0.519 0.406
(20.23)** (19.00)**
Observations 23,571                 31,491                 5,164                  6,084                  10,509               
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent
Note: Dependent variable is a 10-point scale from 1 (Preference for equality) to 10 (Preference for inequality).
1Age and per capita income divided by 1,000, to produce sufficently large coefficients for display.
2Benchmark group are the advanced economies.
 
  16Next, we consider the period of the 1990s using all three waves.  As previously 
mentioned, the number of countries represented in all three waves is small, making it 
difficult to draw strong conclusions, and the absence of countries from the former Soviet 
Union precludes an analysis of the differences with Central and Eastern Europe.  These 
caveats notwithstanding, results from Table 4 support our main hypothesis.  We find that 
the post-socialist economies covered in this sample do not as a group display a greater 
preference for income equality than advanced economies.  There is little support for the 
“socialist” legacy hypothesis. 
 
7 Alternative survey questions on preferences for equality  
 
To conduct our analysis of attitudes to equality we have so far relied on a question 
that asks respondents to rank their preferences on a ten-digit scale where 1 stands for greater 
equality and 10 for less equality.  The question is asked in a large number of countries, is 
repeated over time, and has been used in other parts of the literature to elicit information on 
attitudes to equality.  Thus, it is an ideal question for the purposes of our analysis.   
 
Are our findings robust to different ways of eliciting information on attitudes to 
equality?  This is not an easy question to answer owing to data limitations.  The 1999-2001 
wave of WVS includes one other question, which gets at the same issue in a more 
roundabout way.  It asks respondents to convey their views on what a society—to be 
considered ‘just’—should provide. In particular, respondents are asked to rank the 
importance of eliminating inequality on a 5-point scale, from “1” which stands for “Very 
important” to 5 “Not at all important.”  As this question, which we shall call ‘eliminating 
inequality’ for short, appears to be trying to elicit very similar information as the question 
used in the analysis so far (the ‘preference for equality’ question), we use the responses to 
examine whether our findings are robust to a different way of eliciting respondents’ views.  
Unfortunately, the question was not asked in earlier waves of the WVS, so we cannot use it 
to examine trends over time.   
 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the same equation as in Table 3, column 3 
using the ‘eliminating inequality’ question.  The question is asked of a much smaller sample 
of countries than the ‘preference for equality’ question.  Table 5, Column 1 reports the 
results from using this smaller sample: the total number of observations (30,454) is around 
half the total number of observations in the baseline regression of Table 3, column 3 (over 
60,000).  Comparing results with Table 3 is rendered difficult by differences in country 
coverage of the two questions. So, as a solution, we also report two further sets of results 
based on the common sample of countries where both questions were asked.  Table 5 
columns 2 and 3 report results from using the sample of individuals and countries common 
to both measures (21,302 observations). 
 
Keeping in mind that lower values of both measures indicate greater preference for 
equality we find again that CEE countries are more likely to prefer greater equality (or 
consider eliminating inequalities) while countries of the former Soviet Union outside the 
Baltics are less likely to prefer equality (or consider eliminating inequality). The Baltic states 
are somewhere in between but they generally appear to be closer in their preferences to their 
CEE counterparts.  Thus, our findings on the preferences of CEE relative to the former  
  17Table 5. Preference for Equality and for Eliminating Inequality (Ordered Probit): 1999-2001
(Robust z-statistics in parentheses)
Restricted Sample




1 -15.775 -18.507 -10.401
(5.92)** (5.75)** (3.38)**
Age-squared
1 125.141 134.868 94.824
(4.39)** (3.89)** (2.93)**
Female -0.094 -0.106 -0.087
(6.64)** (6.18)** (5.35)**
No. of Children -0.011 -0.016 -0.002
(1.91) (2.26)* (0.35)
Married 0.048 0.026 0.041
(2.98)** (1.31) (2.20)*
Education
Incomplete Technical/Vocation Education 0.047 -0.011 0.128
(1.86) (0.37) (4.40)**
Complete Technical/Vocation Education 0.067 0.095 0.188
(2.71)** (3.26)** (6.48)**
Incomplete Secondary Education 0.102 0.092 0.185
(4.22)** (2.99)** (6.15)**
Complete Secondary Education 0.144 0.186 0.274
(6.38)** (6.87)** (10.11)**
Incomplete University Education 0.201 0.233 0.302
(7.44)** (6.91)** (9.83)**
Complete University Education 0.28 0.329 0.392
(10.64)** (10.64)** (13.46)**
Income
Lower Income -0.084 -0.066 -0.013
(4.80)** (3.12)** (0.62)
Higher Income 0.153 0.192 0.11
(9.26)** (9.73)** (5.83)**
Labor Force Status
Part-Time Employed -0.01 0.058 -0.019
(0.37) (1.85) (0.68)
Self-Employed 0.173 0.244 0.193
(5.55)** (6.91)** (5.82)**
Unemployed -0.121 -0.088 -0.039
(4.03)** (2.43)* (1.09)
Retired -0.057 -0.024 -0.077
(2.10)* (0.71) (2.48)*




Central and Eastern Europe -0.955 -0.938 -0.746
(20.40)** (19.13)** (16.29)**
Baltics -0.349 -0.182 -0.175
(21.11)** (9.15)** (8.85)**
Other Former Soviet Union (FSU) -0.371 -0.171 0.093
(13.50)** (4.89)** (2.72)**
Developing countries 0.001 0.046 0.38
(0.06) (1.85) (15.68)**
Observations 30,454 21,302 21,302
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent
Note: Dependent variable is a 10-point scale from 1 (Preference for equality) to 10 (Preference for inequality).
and a 5-point scale from 1 (Eliminating inequality very important) to 5 (Not at all important).
1Age and per capita income divided by 1,000, to produce sufficently large coefficients for display.
2Benchmark group are the advanced economies.
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Soviet Union appear to be robust to alternative questions to elicit preferences.  One 
conclusion that does not appear entirely robust to the change of question is that post-Soviet 
economies have a greater preference for inequality than the advanced economies – this 
appears to hold in the common sample (Table 5, column 3) but not in the full sample (Table 
5, column 1).       
 
8 Implications and conclusions   
 
Our results taken all together contest the current consensus in the literature.  We 
find little evidence of a socialist legacy en bloc in attitudes to equality.  CEE countries are 
more likely to prefer greater equality compared to the CIS countries, with the Baltic states 
somewhere in-between. These patterns also appear relatively stable over time. The results 
also confirm the conventional individual and demographic determinants of preferences for 
equality. Our results appear to be more or less upheld when we consider an alternative 
approach to eliciting preferences for a much smaller sample of countries, namely the 
preference for eliminating inequality. 
 
Our findings do not seem to be unique to the WVS.  A newly available source of 
data, the Life in Transition Survey (2006), which covers all transition economies in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, also provides evidence of differences in preference for 
equality across CEE, the Baltics and the countries of the former Soviet Union.
12  On 
average, Central and Eastern European economies are found to have more egalitarian 
preferences than their CIS counterparts. The Baltic countries stand out as being distinct 
from other countries of the former Soviet Union.  However, in contrast to the results 
presented in this paper, this data source suggests that suggest that the Baltics have more 
egalitarian preferences as a group than CEE countries.    
 
What do the findings in this paper mean for policy?  Our findings suggest that in 
countries of the former Soviet Union there may be little political or social consensus for 
moving towards greater income equality.   Thus, the unequal outcomes observed may not be 
the consequence of limited administrative capacity of the state to redistribute incomes, or 
different levels of confidence in ability of the state, but the lack of a political consensus that 
it should do so.  In contrast, in countries in CEE there appears to be greater support for 
income equality.   
 
The differences between the two groups of countries may simply reflect different 
means towards a common end.  The WVS also seeks respondents’ views on government 
responsibility for different aspects of economy and society (such as pensions).  Although we 
do not present the results in detail here, our analysis suggests that all residents of post-
socialist economies prefer greater government responsibility than their advanced economy 
counterparts.  Significantly, there is no difference in reported preference for 
government responsibility between CEE countries and the countries of the former 
                                                 
12 We look at unconditional mean scores for different country groups.  The LITS measure of “preference for 
equality” is based on responses to the following survey question: To what extent do you agree with the 
following statement, “The gap between the rich and the poor today in this country should be reduced”, where 
1=Strongly disagree, and 5 =Strongly agree. 
  19Soviet Union.  It is possible that residents of CEE regard reducing income equality through 
redistribution as an important means whereby the government takes responsibility for 
societal harmony whereas residents of the former Soviet Union place greater emphasis on 
government responsibility in other spheres.  Another question in the WVS asks respondents’ 
views on the role of the state in ensuring minimum standards of living.  In analyzing 
responses to this question we find that countries of the former Soviet Union view it 
important that the government provide basic needs for all, more so than CEE countries and 
the Baltics.   Thus, countries of the former Soviet Union may have a greater preference for 
government interventions that reduce absolute deprivation rather than those that restrain 
inequality.  Our data do not allow us to probe any of these hypotheses further, so we leave it 
to further research to take up these issues in detail.   
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  23Appendix Table 1. Countries in the Benchmark Regression Sample By Survey Year
1





B e l a r u s XXX
Georgia X
M o l d o v a XXX
Russia X X X
U k r a i n e XXX
The Baltics
E s t o n i a XXXXX
Latvia X X
L i t h u a n i a XXXXX
CEE/SEE
Albania X
Bosnia and Herzegovina X X X
Bulgaria X




Montenegro X X X
P o l a n d XXXXX
Romania X






















S p a i n XXX
Sweden X X
Switzerland X
U S A XXX
United Kingdom X  
  24Appendix Table 1. (concluded)
1990 1995-97 1999-2001 Panel-2 Panel-3
Other
Algeria X
Argentina X X X
Bangladesh X X X
Brazil X X
Chile X X X
China X X X
Dominican Republic X
Egypt X




Mexico X X X
Morocco X
N i g e r i a XXXXX
Pakistan X X X
Peru X X X
Philippines X
Singapore X
South Africa X X
South Korea X X X
Taiwan X
Tanzania X
T u r k e y XXXXX
Uganda X
Uruguay X
Venezuela X X X
Vietnam X
Zimbabwe X
1Based on the benchmark (Table 3) regression with preference for equality as dependent variable. Regressions 
using other dependent variables may have smaller samples.  
  25Appendix Table 2. Preference for Equality (Ordered Probit): 1990-93 and 1995-97
















Incomplete Technical/Vocation Education -0.003 0.026
(0.080) (1.120)
Complete Technical/Vocation Education 0.18 0.178
(5.28)** (8.81)**
Incomplete Secondary Education 0.332 0.079
(8.98)** (2.90)**
Complete Secondary Education 0.329 0.142
(4.59)** (5.87)**
Incomplete University Education 0.077 0.337
(1.520) (10.65)**
Complete University Education 0.273 0.328
(0.800) (14.13)**
Income
Lower Income -0.104 -0.035
(3.62)** (2.12)*
Higher Income 0.195 0.14
(6.39)** (8.80)**
Labor Force Status












Developing countries -0.081 0.339
(2.57)* (19.22)**




Other Former Soviet Union (FSU) 0.439
(26.09)**
Observations 11,211                 33,916                
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent
Note: Dependent variable is a 10-point scale from 1 (Preference for equality) to 10 (Preference for i
1Age and per capita income divided by 1,000, to produce sufficently large coefficients for display.
2Benchmark group are the advanced economies.
 
  26